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Nineteenth Party Conference: Servicemen Discuss CPSU Central Committee Theses

18000490 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Jun 88 p 2

[Suggestions addressed at the 19th All-Union Party Conference: "I suggest...."]

[Text] During the nationwide discussion of the CPSU Central Committee theses, party, trade-union and Komsomol meetings were held in the Army and Navy with the participation of party and nonparty members. In an atmosphere of glasnost and democracy, businesslike and critical discussions took place on providing reliable guarantees for the irreversibility of perestroika, quality parameters, combat readiness of units and ships, and reserves for improving the efficiency of defense building. The suggestions and views expressed in the course of lively discussions were sent to the 19th All-Union Party Conference. Following are some of them.

Lt Col V. Bolysov: The time has come for a more profound consideration at the conference of the role and tasks of the USSR Armed Forces, and the basic trends and ways of restructuring the activities of commanders, political organs and party and Komsomol organizations in the Army and Navy.

What is needed is thorough and extensive development of the thesis on increasing the efficiency of defense building, primarily via qualitative parameters in the areas of ordnance and personnel. This must reflect not only the tasks of the Armed Forces but of all interested governmental and social institutions throughout the country.

Lt Col V. Shelest: An end must be put to the formal presentation of awards to party and soviet personnel on the occasion of anniversaries. It becomes even more important to remember this if high end results have not been achieved in their work sectors. I suggest that a petition be submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on depriving of high governmental awards individuals who were compromised during the period of stagnation or obtained such awards undeservedly, for loyalty to individuals, on the basis of favoritism, etc.

Soviet Army employee A. Aleksandrov: Perestroika puts on the agenda the question of creating a Central Control Commission, which would be elected by the congress and be answerable to it only. Its main function, in my view, should be to supervise the observance of the Leninist norms of party life and party discipline in the party agencies, including the CPSU Central Committee.

Capt V. Onufriyev, political worker: Greater attention must be paid to problems of cadre policy in the Army and Navy. It is no secret that, for a variety of reasons, of late the prestige of the officer career has declined. Obvious among them are an excessive work load, lack of

conveniences, and poor attention to the families. This exerts a certain influence. Such problems are part of the governmental concern for the quality parameters of combat readiness.

Nor does equalization in material support of the work of officers contribute to the enhancement of the human factor. In my view, salaries must be made consistent with the individual contributions of the serviceman to the implementation of his assignments. We must adopt a strictly individual approach to moral incentives as well. For example, medals for seniority are today presented to anyone, regardless of the type of service record. Strictly speaking, why should this be?

Greater exigency must be displayed toward every party member. This is a basic line in the activities of party organizations. The fate of perestroika depends on each one of us, on our individual contribution to it.

Lt Col B. Litvinov: Let me make the following stipulation in the theses more specific: Party committee secretaries on the raykom or higher levels must not be elected for more than two terms. I believe that an age limit must be set for such categories—65. This would prevent stagnation phenomena among cadres and ensure their periodical renovation. It would exclude communist boastfulness and dependency.

Soviet Army employee I. Lytkin, party committee secretary: Under the situation of glasnost reports on party budget expenditures must be periodically published. This could be done, for example, in PRAVDA. In connection with the reduction of the apparatus, the primary party organizations should be allowed to keep a certain amount of the funds (for purchasing political publications, paying for the services performed by the Znaniye Society, carrying out some educational projects, and so on).

Soviet Army employee V. Rukomoynikov, party committee secretary: I believe that the rayon, city and oblast party committees should abolish their industrial and agricultural departments. Such departments exist in the soviet agencies and the two frequently duplicate each other's functions. The party committees should deal with political leadership and not take over the functions of soviet and economic authorities.

Col A. Vaysero: How can we avoid rejects in cadre policy? I suggest that we abandon the practice of moving delinquent party members holding managerial positions from one job to another, with a reprimand. Mandatorily an entry should be made in their file: "Possibility of further use in a leading position excluded." It is only after this reprimand has been expunged from a party member's record that he could be recommended for a managerial position.

I. Shulga, engineer: In order to improve the efficiency of the work of soviets on all levels, I suggest that 50 percent of the deputies be freed from their job obligations. They should also give up the benefits which undermine the reputation of people's representatives. For example, we are amazed in railroad stations and airports at the pomposity of the spacious premises bearing the sign "Hall for Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Supreme Soviets of Union Republics," while in the public waiting rooms the people are unbelievably crowded.

Lt Col V. Shelkov, party committee secretary: Greater attention should be paid to problems of party social policy and concern for the working person. Could we consider normal the fact that a large number of officers and ensigns, who complete the last part of their service in distant garrisons, remain without apartments for many years and, in their old age, are forced to roam from one place to another? I believe that firm guarantees must be provided, ensuring the social protection of military personnel passing into the reserve.

Lt Col V. Komarev, department chief: The party Central Committee theses mention the efficiency of defense building. I support this idea entirely. Let me point out, however, that in order to ensure the qualitative staffing of the Armed Forces with cadres we must abandon the habit of considering any case of dismissal of an officer as exceptional. It so happens that people try to prevent such layoffs by a variety of means. My suggestion is to give the officer the right to go into the reserve or to resign after 5 years of service. At the same time, efforts must be intensified elsewhere: More attention must be paid to ordinary conveniences and material support of officers and ensigns and the development of conveniences in the garrisons. The question is pressing of allowing officers and ensigns who are completing their service in the Armed Forces to apply for housing to the executive committees of their chosen places of residence 2 to 3 years prior to their conversion to reserve status.

Lt Col A. Minakov: It seems to me that the topic of social justice is strongly emphasized in the theses. I would like to consider this matter from party positions, so to say. Why is it that in the consideration of personal matters an exception is made in the case of communists in managerial positions? Their actions are not considered by the primary party organizations. I suggest that this approach be changed.

Lt Col A. Petrov, political department officer: We speak a great deal of paper chase during the period of stagnation. This is right. However, the process of perestroika has not affected paper work in the shop party organizations. Minutes should be kept only of the most important meetings (enrollment, personal affairs, accountability reports, elections). At the present time paper storms frequently obscure live work with people.

Soviet Army employee F. Strelko, method worker: The time has come to forbid night-shift work by women in industry. The workday of women with minor children should be shortened. Aid to single mothers should be increased. Women who refuse to take care of their children should pay child support.

Maj M. Pishchulov, group commander: The accelerated building of housing has resulted in a depressing monotony of villas and cities. Architectural features are considered, alas, archaic. This is painful. I suggest that the conference consider this matter. Obsolete layouts for house building must be abandoned. The local soviets and construction organizations must be held strictly answerable for the quality of commissioned housing.

Capt S. Ivanov, engineer: I suggest that in party documents the term "rank and file party members" be deleted. In the party everyone is equal.

Sr Lt Yu. Zaytsev, company commander: In order to eliminate red tape and bureaucracy in solving various vitally important problems related to the Army and Navy, it would be expedient, in my view, to set up under the USSR Supreme Soviet a special commission on Armed Services Affairs. The local soviets should set up social control commissions supervising the training of young people for military service. I am referring not to the quantity but the quality of the contingent with which the commander and the political worker must deal....

Col Gen A. Ivanov: The enhancement of quality parameters in the training of the personnel is impossible without a corresponding improvement in the quality of material training facilities. For the time being, many of their elements are not supplied promptly. We must increase the responsibility of defense industry enterprises working on the orders we have placed.

Maj A. Petrov, topographic service officer: I was concerned by the fact that the CPSU Central Committee theses do not say a single word on the mass information and propaganda media. Yet a number of problems have accumulated here. I believe that, while broadening and intensifying glasnost and democracy, we must block the publication of semitruthful materials in the press. Such materials shyly bypass sensitive areas. Frequently, the expressions "some comrades" and "objective circumstances" are used instead of naming the actual culprits. It is in the interest of perestroika to report in greater detail results of public opinion surveys throughout the country on the most sensitive and pressing matters.

Lt Col V. Osipov, staff officer: Reading closely the theses on the measures taken for the implementation of the economic reform and the way they are being paralyzed by the bureaucratic positions assumed by a number of ministries and departments, I suggest the following: In order to enhance the responsibility of all ministries and departments in terms of the implementation of the reform, it is necessary to stipulate specific steps of

personal influence on the personnel of the administrative apparatus, and increase exigency concerning the results of activities (or inactivities), as well as uncompromisingly condemn actions which cause material harm.

Ensign B. Ivanov, technician-mechanic: As part of the new political thinking, problems of CPSU national policy must be thoroughly developed. We need a specific program which would include political, economic and social steps aimed at solving problems which arise; all institutions within the political system through which national interests must be determined and coordinated must be enhanced.

Lt Col F. Mitkovets, staff officer: It must be stipulated that all laws prior to their promulgation are subject to nationwide discussion. Consolidated remarks and suggestions should be published in IZVESTIYA.

Yu. Chernavkin, designer: It is time to legislate the fact that any step taken by a department, enterprise or organization which affects socioeconomic and natural conditions in a given area could be implemented only with the knowledge and permission of the local soviets of people's deputies.

Capt N. Babenko: Today we speak a great deal and with a feeling of concern about young people and their tastes, views and attachments. I suggest that we raise once again the question of the "Law on Youth." Such a law should define the rights and obligations of young people in all areas of social life and relations between the Komsomol and the other youth organizations. I read somewhere that there seems to be a draft of such a law. Such a law should be submitted to nationwide discussion.

Soviet Army employee V. Tikhonov: I suggest that a special printed organ (newspaper, journal, bulletin) be published, to cover ecological problems, such as the condition of the atmosphere and water, and forest resources, flora and fauna, radiation background, and so on, for the basic areas of the country.

Col Yu. Keleberda: The CPSU Central Committee theses justifiably note that positive changes have been noticed in the development of science and technology; exigency concerning the technical standard of output has increased.... In order to accelerate scientific and technical progress, in my view, it would be necessary to restore the reputation and prestige of the engineer (foreman) in industry.

Maj Yu. Kurtish, political worker: We must see to it that the military-patriotic upbringing of young people is considered, not in words but in actions, one of the most important obligations of the primary party organizations and enterprises, establishments and educational institutions.

Sr Lt I. Shetinin, platoon commander: I believe that in order to upgrade the quality of reinforcement of party ranks it would be expedient to extend the candidacy period of people joining the CPSU to 2 years. This would make it possible to test better the political, practical and moral qualities of the new member.

Private V. Cherednik, driver, nonparty member: In my view, it is necessary to formulate more efficient steps in the struggle against drunkenness and alcoholism. Through the joint efforts of party and Komsomol organizations and the entire public, we must create an atmosphere of intolerance of moonshiners, loafers, amateurs of profiting from other people's misfortune, and the unhealthy weakness for drinking. There should be fewer slogans and meaningless assurances.

Capt Third Rank P. Sedler, political department instructor-psychologist: In some cases the load assumed by secretaries of party organizations in subunits and units, who hold full-time jobs, is quite heavy. Official obligations force the person to spread out, as they say, despite the responsibility of doing party work. I believe that such work should be encouraged, and not only morally. For example, this could be achieved with the help of a small withholding from party dues. I suggest that this question be considered at the conference.

Maj P. Zinchenko, department chief: I suggest that problems of defense building, party military policy, upgrading the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces and the entire course of perestroika in the Army and Navy be discussed at an all-Army conference, after the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

05003

**19th Party Conference: Regimental Commander
Records First Impressions of Theses**

18000480 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 May 88 p 1

[Article by Lt Colonel O. Nikonov and Major A. Bugay, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Ural Military District (by telephone): "CPSU Central Committee Theses: Initial Reactions"]

[Text] The regimental subunit returned from the exercise as night was falling. Usually, the largest crowd would gather in the premises of the party committee. On this occasion, however, the center of gravity had shifted to the commanding officer's office. Although he was on he had come to headquarters to find out, at the crack of dawn as they say, what the people had learned. Something else had also happened, however!...

Although not everyone had had the opportunity to look at the fresh newspaper, for only yesterday they were still in the field, some officers had already become familiar

with the CPSU Central Committee theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference. It was thus that we witnessed the initial reactions and live exchange of views.

"Personally," Lt. Colonel V. Onchurov, party organization secretary, said, "I have now gained, how can I put it more precisely, spiritual firmness. Let me explain: of late the situation has not been entirely clear. The news in the newspapers was explosive. One newspaper would claim something while another would question it. I then did some reading and realized that virtually all of my views were being supported. It was accurately said that during the period of perestroika the party's vanguard role must be strengthened. Currently the party is actively formulating the ideology of renovation, of our entire new life. Look at what is being said about the primary party organizations as the political nucleus of any collective, which must be influenced through the party members. You understand, through the party members. Speaking openly, this does not happen here, for in frequent cases we hold our party meetings formally. Some party members show no interest whatsoever. It is only of late that good signs have appeared. Why? Because exigency toward all party members has increased. I personally especially approve of that section in the theses which discusses the expediency of having a sociopolitical certification of the party members as an efficient means of self-cleansing and strengthening the party.

"There is also something else, something which concerns me a great deal, and which I must mention: The matter of historical thought. The mass information media have already done a great deal in this respect, and today we cannot do without it: the soldiers are asking, but some officers, alas, occasionally become confused, having failed to master the situation. Recently, a comrade who shall remain unnamed told me: What are you being excited about? If those up there want it, they will pull all the stops; if not, no one will find out anything. Such is the result of the impact of the publication of articles, such as N. Andreyeva's in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. Yet the theses clearly state that the policy of openness and glasnost and free discussion of the problems of our past and present will be pursued by the party consistently. This too is inspiring."

"I did not think that I would see you here so early," the regimental commander said, joining in the conversation. "We came back last night, and have barely had time to shut our eyes. It is pleasing to see that good work was done at the exercise and that one can feel the pulse beat of life.

"This conversation can not be calm. We had been waiting for this document. I read the theses and I understand Viktor Ivanovich Onchurov's feelings. Our views agree. This applies, for instance, to the need to enhance the theoretical standard of ideological and political work. The local press informs us that many informal

youth associations exist in Sverdlovsk. Alongside valuable suggestions, however, there also are political demagoguery, confusion and, in some cases, deliberate speculations. This is saddening. Unfortunately, for the time being we have nothing with which to counter this.

"Incidentally, we are also ignoring the question of participation in the work of the soviet authorities. I was told by Colonel Volkov, the former regimental commander, that he was virtually unable to influence the solution of problems related to land use, environmental protection and youth upbringing. He was told to mind his own business: if preparations for army service are being discussed, then you may speak. But why only then? The problems are numerous. It is no accident that the theses discuss extensively problems related to improvements in our governmental system.

"Naturally, at this point we cannot fail to mention democracy. I could see people smile at the idea that it is precisely the commanding officer who was speaking of democracy. You criticized me at a meeting, claiming that I was virtually making advances to the ensigns. Understand, comrades, that I do not. One must work with every single one of them, for they are not alike, and every one of them has his own world outlook, not according to instructions but on a one-to-one basis. It is then that no one would try to be crafty. This too involves democracy. Everyone must have the right to speak, and if you happen to think differently, say it. No one should be afraid in this case, for we have already lost a great deal out of fear of having our own opinion. This, in my view, leads to violations of regulations. One must consult with every commander and party member. This guarantees success. I will then make a decision, based on collective opinion. Am I not right?"

Something was also bothering Captain A. Goncharov, the regimental propagandist:

"Perestroika exposed the grave disparity between the level of propaganda and the existing political situation in the country. Could we fail to see our lecturers' confusion? It could not be concealed. I have already voiced my opinion to the party committee, so that what I am saying is nothing new. I am mentioning this, however, to draw attention to the following: the theses are a political program which enables us to understand more profoundly current and future processes.

"It is not only in political classes that we discuss the political situation in the country. For example, Senior Lieutenants Kazakov and Yevseyenko told me of the stormy discussions which took place in their subunits regarding newspaper and journal articles. Some people receive with their mail clippings from the local press. Let me tell you this: an extensive amount of information is reaching the army and one must be in full possession of the facts to be able to interpret it accurately.

"Here is something else that disturbs me: The theses raise particularly strongly the question of the artist's responsibility for the fate of the country and the moral status of society. It is easy to shake up foundations. But you, comrade writers and journalists, describe for us the real commander, so that his image will not be stilted but will be remembered a lifetime. Where are the Serpilins of today? Have they vanished from the army or are the artists unwilling to see them? Where are the Furmanovs? They too cannot be found. This is a matter less of creative ability than, above all, of civic stance. I firmly believe that wherever "privilege" is found it must be written about. However, it is necessary to expose the roots, to generate disgust of such cases and not to relish them. They should not be depicted as 'daring discoveries'.

"Few people have also thought of the fact that in the course of his 2 years of military service the soldier will have seen more than 200 feature films."

Unquestionably, today we are mentioning merely the very first impressions from reading the thesis. They are as yet to be studied profoundly and discussed comprehensively. But we can already confidently say that the thoughts, assessments and conclusions and, finally, the great spiritual power which are concentrated within this party document will help us, party members in the army, to develop a clearer attitude toward the ways and means needed in solving our vital problems.

05003

19th Party Conference: Servicemen Respond to Conference Theses

18000478 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 May 88 p 1

[Major I. Sas talks to party members in unit X: "We Have Faith in the Success of Perestroika"]

[Text] **Correspondent:** Vladimir Antonovich, I see your notes on the margin of the published CPSU Central Committee theses. Would you care to comment on them?

Lt Colonel V. Tsviliy, unit commander: What excites the serviceman the most? Naturally, problems related to the defense of the fatherland. In the theses, the party's Central Committee formulates this question as follows: Henceforth the efficiency of Soviet military building must be ensured primarily on the basis of qualitative parameters, in terms of both equipment and personnel. In practical terms, what does this mean to us? It means attaining a new quality level in combat training; take from the equipment all it can give; and enhance work with the people to a level which will ensure the total freedom of initiative. All of this urgently calls for reviewing the current work style and the search for more efficient ways of solving problems of combat readiness and discipline.

Correspondent: I know that you have already exchanged with others views on the theses. What did you discuss?

Major A. Karlin, deputy unit commander: We believe that problems of defense building and the armed forces must be paid the greatest possible attention at the party conference, for here as well, today we need a well thought-out and efficiently regulated restructuring platform which would exclude the possibility that imperialist circles may attain military superiority.

Correspondent: You must have also acquired some deeply personal impressions from this document, for it affects all aspects of our life.

Lt. Colonel V. Tsviliy: Naturally it contains things which irritate. I read that "the rehabilitation of those who in the past were the victims of groundless political accusations and illegalities is our party duty," and I think: What a pity that we undertake to fulfill this duty after such a long delay. The war was already over when my father was declared an "enemy of the people." He had spent a lifetime serving the people, and all of a sudden he was an "enemy." He was rescued by S.A. Kovpak, the commander of a partisan formation, famous throughout the country. He knew my father from the partisan movement.

We must restore the honor, dignity and good name of people who, although innocent, fell victim to illegality. If this could not be accomplished during their lifetime, this terrible suspicion must be lifted from their children or grandchildren. I vote in favor of this party line with both hands, and I believe that I will have the support of many people.

Major A. Karlin. Your family was not the only to be affected by this wave of repressions. During the time of collectivization my grandfather refused to join a kolkhoz and was exiled. This was a tragedy for him and his family. What numerous such tragedies were there all over the country, all concealed behind the slogan of the struggle for socialism. That is why I have adopted as my personal conviction the thought expressed in the theses that to us the question not only of the objectives and values of socialism but also the means of achieving them and of the human cost they extract is by no means indifferent to us.

Correspondent: Today society would like to be given reliable guarantees which would exclude the very possibility of this happening again. These guarantees include the democratization of all areas of social life. The theses offer a program for the intensification and development of these processes. What is your reaction to them?

Lt Colonel V. Tsviliy: As commander I frequently have to deal with the local soviets. Many problems are being solved with great difficulty. Here is a simple example from ordinary life: We have no bathing facilities. This created difficulties. In order to resolve them I had to

address myself to the party raykom. I cannot say that the people there were unwilling to help us. The soviets have gradually lost their rights. They are not masters of their territory. The power must be returned to the soviets. Through their representatives, the people must feel that they control the situation.

Captain V. Zhevnerov: I remember my student years and elections to local soviets. I can honestly say that I did not feel that I was participating in a governmental affair. To the leadership what mattered most was to report on time and to see to it that there were no excesses whatsoever. As to who was elected, that was something which should not concern us. Some times we had not even laid eyes on the candidates. I believe that at the all-Union conference such questions must be considered in all details.

Correspondent: Naturally, we look at the ideas related to democratization also as refracted through army reality. What do you consider particularly important in this respect?

Major V. Troshin, unit party buro secretary: It is still difficult to instill the simple thought that democratization does not undermine the foundations of one-man command but, conversely, strengthens them. We had the following case: In last year's elections for the unit's Komsomol committee secretary, the Komsomol members rejected the nomination of an officer, a nomination which had been approved on all levels. They nominated their own candidate. We accepted this calmly. As time passed, we realized that the Komsomol members had been right and that they had made the right choice. Yet how troublesome could have this situation become had we started to apply pressure, to threaten and to persuade. That is how life is. Our line should be one of fewer preconceptions and greater trust in people.

Correspondent: A great deal is being said in the theses about openness and glasnost in party life. Here is a question for you, as party buro secretary, with something hidden between the lines: When was the last open party meeting in the unit?

Major V. Troshin: On your way out, look at the announcement: the meeting we intend to hold soon will be open, as have been, incidentally, most meetings held this year. Therefore, perestroika is making its corrections. As a rule, we invite party and nonparty members to attend the buro sessions as well. We do not have to be talked into it, for we have realized by ourselves the usefulness of this practice. The theses confirm the accuracy of this line although, naturally, a great deal more must be done for democracy and glasnost to become the law of our life.

Correspondent: How did the party members react to the idea of the sociopolitical certification of party members as a means of the party's self-cleansing and strengthening?

Senior Ensign D. Levashev: My only concern on this matter is for this measure not to be belittled or reduced to verbiage in the local areas. At this point we must have our say, and approach such certification with updated criteria, for membership still includes many unsuitable people who sneaked into the party.

Correspondent: Does a feeling of inner disagreement with some of the proposals included in the thesis develop in some?

Major Grechka: Let me mention the restriction concerning the holding of elective party positions for two consecutive terms. This is a proper and very necessary measure. What I fail to understand is something else: What is then the purpose of the stipulation about a third term? Would this not provide a loophole for promoting the old approach? Many of the laws we have passed work poorly precisely because of an abundance of all sorts of stipulations and "however's."

As a whole, this document strengthens the conviction of the irreversibility of change. I judge this by the mood of my comrades. It instills in us faith in perestroika and is becoming its efficient instrument.

05003

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Runs Reader's Proposals for Party Conference

18000413A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 May 88 p 1

[Article by Captain 1st Rank V. Adazhiy, senior instructor, Department of the History of the CPSU and Party-Political Work, Military-Medical Academy imeni S. M. Kirov, under rubric "Towards the 19th All-Union Party Conference": "Letters Concerning *Perestroika*: Renouncing the "Second Face""]

[Text] I would like to share opinions that I have nurtured for many years. And that I have actually remained silent for many years. Why? I shall not hem and haw. During the period of stagnation, it was as though many of us got two faces. One was for meetings, sessions, conferences. The other was the true one. It was worn in the family, among friends...

When you think about the reason for this duality, you involuntarily come to the idea that even now, with the ever-expanding *glasnost* and democratization of all aspects of our life, the thing that sometimes prevents us from having "one face" is simple human... fear. Fear of one's position, of one's name, of how this will affect one's job, one's family. Fear that your thought, your idea, your opinion will be thrown on the scrap heap and an offensive label will be placed on you. And there is nothing strange about all this, because that feeling developed over a period of decades. Free breathing was inhibited by the cult. It was choked by voluntarism. And it hid behind "unanimous approval"...

The time that has passed since the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee has shown that the overcoming of stagnant situations, the destruction of the mechanism of inhibition, is a complicated matter that requires party members to be both brave and selfless. Under these conditions, pharisaism and double-dealing become especially dangerous. And it is absolutely impossible to live any more according to the principle "I have my own opinion, but I do not agree with it, because So-and-so will give me a dirty look."

Therefore, it seems to me, something that ought to become one of the tasks of the 19th party conference is the development of that democratic mechanism which would not only propose, but would also legalize the open comparison of opinion, broad discussions, arguments, and polemics. Without this mechanism, it would scarcely be possible to achieve that which is called socialist pluralism. Otherwise, there would be a continuation of the monologues, and the unanimous votes with the mandatory subsequent discussion in the lobby. And the work style that should be the criterion and example for creating this mechanism is the work style of V. I. Lenin.

And now I would like to discuss certain other factors.

In recent years there has been lively discussion of the question of putting a line of demarcation between the party, soviet, administrative, economic, and other agencies, and that is a question which, under the present conditions, is taking on particular significance. **I propose, by way of a first step, the development and discussion in party organizations of the duties of the party administrators, beginning with the party group organizer—proceeding from the idea of the democratization of party life.**

An exceptionally important question in *perestroika* is the party's link with the workers, the knowledge of people's true moods, the flexible and time-responsive resolution of their wants and needs. Something that acts as one of the powerful channels for this link is the organizing of visits by citizens, and work with their letters, statements, complaints, and proposals. When you become acquainted with the figures concerning the number of letters received at various administrative levels and concerning the number of visits logged, it becomes completely incomprehensible. With the tremendous administrative apparatus in the country, people spend 1.5 or two months just to get an answer to their question or to be allowed to visit the raykom or rayispolkom, not to mention higher administrative levels. How can we put a psychological evaluation on this? What electronic computers are we supposed to use to compute the material losses?

A special responsibility for the situation that has been created is borne by the local, soviet, and party agencies and their administrators—those who, according to the position that they hold, are supposed to stand closest of

all to people. But let's just ask the question: who, when, and by virtue of what factors, established for them 2-3 hours of visits a week or a month? For whom is this advantageous? Certainly not the job at hand. Certainly not the people. So it must be the bureaucrat. How, then, is it possible to activate today the human factor after limiting the direct communication with the person of labor, after poking his face in little signs that read "from... to..."

At the present time a lot has been said about "confidence" telephones. It would seem that these telephones ought to be installed first of all at raykoms and obkoms, soviets and ministries, political administrations, political departments, etc. With the aid of technical means, the resolution of the problem of recording a person's statement to a particular administrative level will not pose any difficulty. But that will free thousands of people of the need to ask permission to leave work, to travel dozens or hundreds of kilometers, to stand in line waiting to visit someone, to spend the night at railroad terminals, and to write out mountains of papers, which also have to be answered by papers. We should know those telephone numbers like 01, 02, 03, and it would be desirable if the citizens were met at the raykoms, soviets, political agencies, and all public and state institutions were not militiamen on duty, but assigned workers employed by those agencies.

And one more question. Organizations that continue to remain in the shadow in our society are various kinds of "special institutions" to provide services for the administrators of a definite rank: hospitals, clinics, sanatoriums, department stores, single dwellings, recreation rooms, etc. But the administrators already have high salaries, personal vehicles, dachas... Obviously, they ought to share everything else equally with everyone. In the same line. Then those who are already standing in it will actually sense the democratization and the deepening of social justice. And those who take their place in that line will get more energy in resolving the problems that have accumulated.

And, finally, the last word.

The effectiveness and the final result of party work depends largely upon the extent to which the decisions made at the party meetings have been thought out and the extent to which they reflect reality, as well as depending upon the monitoring of their fulfillment. And yet it is precisely in this link that we ourselves frequently give rise to formalism and fraud. Because of a superficial approach to making decisions, the low rate of monitoring, and the weak personal demand for their fulfillment. In addition, **in many party organizations, in the course of *perestroika*, it is becoming the rule for every meeting to consider the results of the fulfillment of the previous decisions and to make the appropriate conclusions on that basis.**

It would seem that it would be desirable to consolidate this practice in paragraph 54 of the CPSU Rules, that is, to make it the mandatory norm for intraparty work, that is independent of subjective views and opinions. This gauge would increase our responsibility for developing and making collective decisions and the personal demand for their fulfillment.

5075

Rayon's Leader Resists Garrison's Initiative

18010399a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 May 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Sytnik, Far Eastern Military District]

[Text] "I am very sorry that I did not attend the meeting of the rayonkom bureau for I would have blown your plan to smithereens," the voice of the woman at the other end of the line was seething with anger. "If you are going to do this then why not give the school children training in firing weapons and help to equip military classrooms..."

"Excuse me, Svetlana Vasilyevna, but we are speaking about military-patriotic education of school children," I tried to explain but was immediately interrupted:

"What do you mean, Comrade Lt Col, were you thinking about teaching me how to organize military-patriotic work? I have no time to talk with you at all. I have many other things to do that are much more important."

This conversation took place between me and the head of the education department of Tsentralnyy Rayon in Khabarovsk, S. Surovtseva. And here is what led up to this conversation.

Party and komsomol organizations of our military unit came out with an initiative: to organize on base various groups in which children from schools of the rayon would take a course using the training mockups and increase their physical fitness in the sports complex.

One day we invited directors and military leaders of the educational institutions to our unit, familiarized them with our plan, and showed them the material base for training. They all had a unanimous opinion: it was a necessary thing, undoubtedly, and many school children would be interested in it. But our guests were disturbed by the fact that it would be necessary to hold most of the classes in the evening since it was almost impossible for the soldiers and officers to find any other time. "This is even better," they told us. "The children will not dawdle along the way."

Some time later I discussed all this at a meeting of the party rayonkom bureau where they were considering the issue of improving the military-patriotic training of youth in the rayon. Directors and military leaders of the schools and representatives of the rayon education

department and military commissariats were there. And everyone there, including the members of the bureau of the party rayonkom, approved of the proposed plan. With the exception, as it later became clear, of the head of the rayon education department. We cannot understand why Svetlana Vasilyevna did not like this plan. I do not even wish to venture a guess. But this is not the first time the powerful hand of the head of the rayon education department has been felt in the activities of small classes. I must say that we had prepared very carefully for this. And how surprised we were when a small group of children from only three of the thirty schools in the rayon came to the unit along with the military training leaders.

"What, were there no children in the other schools who wanted to do this?" I asked the military training leaders.

"That is not it," answered one of them. "Call the rayon education department and everything will become clear."

I called. The content of our conversation is given above.

Both that time and subsequently when attempts were made to give the green light to what seemed to us to be a valuable and important initiative I always got the feeling that I was up against a brick wall, and I could not go over it nor could I go around it. One time I happened to share my impressions with the rayon military commissar Lt Col F. Shitik. Fedor Konstantinovich sighed:

"Whenever I have the occasion to solve problems with Svetlana Vasilyevna or one of her subordinates I frequently have that same feeling. I remember one time when we were organizing rayon firing competitions and Comrade Surovtsev arbitrarily blocked the access to the firing range."

Time passed and our initiative was about to die away. There was nothing left to do but, as a member of the bureau of the party rayonkom, go to the first secretary, Anatoliy Petrovich Vodin. There was also a discussion of this subject with the secretary of the party kraykom, Valentina Fedorovna Sivayeva. She promised to straighten the matter out and to help. And more school children actually did begin to attend the groups. But far from all the schools were represented. And what is alarming is that very few of the children were from the senior classes—that is, the ones with the greatest need for the classes, who tomorrow would be protecting the homeland with arms in hand. But for some reason this does not concern workers of the rayon educational department—the agency whose functions include issues of training youth for military service. Such a position of the comrades from the public education department seems more than strange.

11772

Comment on Progress of Glasnost in Military Affairs Journalism

18300215 Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No. 2
Feb 88 pp. 5-6

[Article by Major M. Syrtlanov, correspondent and organizer, department of party life, for the district newspaper LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA: "Criticism? It Was Not Ordered"]

[Text] How is restructuring going in the editorial offices of military newspapers? Most likely, this question disturbs others besides my colleagues, army journalists.

Not that long ago, the suppression of criticism and dissatisfaction of the senior commanders with bold articles met us at every step. This "dissatisfaction" was sometimes reflected in journalistic fates, in our professional careers. Here is an example of this.

The chief of one of the leading editorial departments of our newspaper, Lt. Col. N. Kikeshev, had graduated from the academy and is working successfully. He would have been able to rise higher on the service ladder, if 3 years ago he had not "been in a hurry with restructuring," his material on bungling by senior commanders, who had built a tower with marble pilasters on the training ground for show's sake, was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA at the very same time that the matter of appointing Kikeshev as correspondent for the USSR Ministry of Defense central press organ was being considered. The newspaper worker, having washed the dirty linen in public, was thus not appointed.

They decided to transfer sharp-penned war correspondent Sr. Lt. V. Drobot, who had been working for a house paper, to the district newspaper. The editorial board approved Drobot but the political department, to which he had been subordinate when working for the house paper, generated red tape and in every possible way delayed the matter of his transfer. The sole reason the political department was unhappy with the correspondent's critical articles. Today, one could accuse those responsible for this red tape. The trouble is that some of these are no longer there, and others have gone far away. The others have themselves already gained the right to demand explanations.

I also remember my first attempt to interview the chief of the political department of a remote garrison on a previously forbidden subject.

"What? Restructuring? In the army?"—the gray-haired general rejected it out of hand.

I had met him officially when serving in Afghanistan. He was not a man to seek out the easy roads there. What had happened to this person, whom the entire regiment had loved for his courage and modesty?

Even though it was painful to realize that one had to struggle against the unpleasant heritage of the generation of people closest to us—our fathers, I then risked raising an objection:

"Yes, restructuring! In the army as well!"

I will not name the idol of my own fighting youth, if only for the fact that he himself, not for fashion's sake, but sincerely, now speaks of restructuring.

Not long ago I happened to be in that unit once again. I reported to the general of my arrival and the subject upon which I intended to write and was pleased when the general suggested making corrections in my work plan, advising me to critically evaluate the problem of developing young commanders, which was dragging along. "It is time for the newspaper to help us surmount shortcomings," he remarked kindly.

Let me be frank, in the units they have been waiting for a lift on the veto on glasnost. We, the army newspaper workers, have also been waiting.

Much has changed with us since the arrival of new leadership: the editor and his deputy. They managed to overcome bureaucratic administration in the creative process. Upon seeing the support of the editors, many of our journalists "started really writing." Among them, in my opinion, are Captains V. Kazakov, A. Sloma and D. Kushnir, and Sr. Lt. O. Vladimirov. Young both in terms of age and in work experience at the district newspaper, they have found an opportunity to multiply their enthusiasm through the experience of their senior comrades, such as Lt. Colonels V. Kaushanskii and I. Savchuk, and retired Colonel D. Zhuk. The young editors have made friendly contacts with their colleagues at the republic newspapers of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan—contacts which promote the military-patriotic and internationalist upbringing of future soldiers. Transfers in service are not accidental. One of us has advanced to the position of correspondent for a central military journal, another has filled the vacant job of department head by winning a competition (and not by his file!), and another two have gained the right to study at the editorial department of the Military-Political Academy (imeni V. I. Lenin). This is understandable long-term creativity and long-term service should be interrelated and should organically stimulate each other in the interests of the matter to which we have devoted our lives.

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13362

Col Gen Patrikeyev Interviewed Before 19th Party Conference

18010419 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Jun 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Maj Oleg Ivanovich Bedula: "Combat Training. Potential for Acceleration. Reference Points of the Search"]

[Text] The workday routine of combat training, marked by the tension of competition in honor of the 19th All-Union CPSU Congress, gave rich food for thought about ways for further improving the training and indoctrination process. At the request of Maj Oleg Ivanovich Bedula, who is assigned as the permanent correspondent of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for the Volga Military District, some of the results of the competition are analyzed by Col Gen V. Patrikeyev, commanding general of the troops of the district.

[Question] Comrade Colonel General, the winter training period is finished. What kinds of feelings do you have about its results?

[Answer] Let us say, various feelings. Satisfaction from the fact that a lot that was planned in the restructuring of the training process was accomplished all the same. At the same time, substantial changes nonetheless did not occur in some directions. This, of course, is distressing. We are now thinking about what has to be done in the near future at all echelons, including command and control, departments, and services of the district, in order to make additions to their work in priority directions. In the search for ways of acceleration here, naturally, we are oriented on those who achieved qualitative improvements in combat and political training and who lead in the competition in honor of the 19th All-Union CPSU Congress. In particular, these are Lieutenant Colonels N. Polyakov and V. Boldarev, Majors V. Zhezhko, Ya. Yakubovich and A. Skorniyakov, and Senior Lieutenants A. Myamin and E. Krasov. . . The basis of the style of work of these and other officers, in whose sectors the most noticeable growth in personnel training has been achieved, is that there is stronger discipline and order—and initiative, a heightened feeling for what is new, and responsibility and boldness in solving daily tasks. Restructuring can be managed with such people.

But at the same time, we understand that effectiveness and the quality of troop training will not progress, if we do not acquire a principally new attitude toward problems of combat readiness, especially those who are organizers of training and indoctrination, those who are the immediate instructors of training sessions, and those who support the training process. Our best commanders and political officers are now working on the methodology of forming such an attitude.

As they say, life itself has forced us to tackle this problem in real earnest. I recall a recent firing in a tank battalion under the command of Major V. Aleshin. It became readily apparent how worried the subunit commanders, sergeants and soldiers were. Yes, and even I, frankly speaking, empathized with them in my heart. But it turned out that not everyone by far who was present at the tank moving target gunnery range was animated by the atmosphere of operational excitement, emotion, and mutual demands and responsibility. It was apparent, for example, that the personnel of the firing range command were interested only in the operation of the hoist and the preservation of the cable. The chief of the medical service of the regiment did not budge and sat in a vehicle and was obviously bored. And other officers of the command element of the regiment who were present clearly thought of themselves as guests. They say, what is below the turret is not mine. This is an "aphorism" from the lexicon of the past of regimental deputy commanders for armaments.

Afterwards many officials of the district staff took to writing about this situation. But the first one to start searching for a way out was Capt I. Belozertsev, the secretary of the party committee of another unit where the attitude toward the training process of officials of the command element was the very same. Belozertsev posed the question: "Why have many taken the position of observers in restructuring?" And although not everyone supported Belozertsev, a discussion did take place. People looked anew at that which the eye and conscience got used to.

[Question] And what, in your opinion, was the reason for the apathy of the people in the regiment which you talked about earlier?

[Answer] I think that one of the reasons was a systematic breach of the planned character of the training process and the diversion of people from training sessions. The fact is that everything in regimental life is interrelated. And if, let us say, a company getting ready for firing practice is suddenly rushed into housekeeping work, and this occurs repeatedly, then the most ardent calls to intensify the combat readiness of the regiment is viewed there simply as hypocrisy. In fact, in many ways this is the reason for the appearance of the notorious "scope of my responsibilities," beyond which most simply did not want to venture.

Of course, certain types of work also will have to be performed in the future. But we will do this in way that will avoid the unjustified diversion of people from training.

[Question] The military school is also now on the road to restructuring. This question, very likely, is especially pressing for the Volga Military District where there are more than 20 military educational institutions?

[Answer] Yes, we are paying special attention to restructuring in military educational institutions. And there are already some changes. For example, new computer equipment, modern educational and training systems and scientifically-based educational methodology are being actively introduced in the training process of the Ulyanovskiy Higher Technical Service School imeni Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo and the Volskiy Higher Military School of the Rear Services imeni Leninskogo Komsomola. The Togliatti Higher Military Construction Command School was able to find the optimal proportion between lecture sessions and officer candidate independent work. Professional games, practical scientific seminars and conferences, and brief drills—all of these are used actively in the training of future officers.

But there are also problems. There is poor organization of the educational and indoctrination process in a number of schools. There are a lot of flaws in its planning. Insufficient attention is given to the scientific training of instructors. Many costs result from this.

[Question] I recently witnessed this kind of incident in one of the units. Sergeant B. Kurbanov and Senior Sergeant S. Strokun at the command of Lieutenant M. Dmitriyev were working out procedures for putting on a combined arms protective outfit. Both of them received a "2". The young officer explained that in the last half year they trained for the first time. Seeing my disbelief, he explained that the sergeant-instructors for infantry fighting vehicles had, they say, inherent characteristics.

[Answer] This example is a copy of that problem on which we are now working. I could continue: artillerymen pay little attention to mastering rifle weapons, tankers pay little attention to mastering topography, and signalmen pay little attention to mastering engineer preparations. . . This attitude is a result of the very same pattern—the diversion of people from planned training sessions and formalism in all of its manifestations.

In the course of the concluding training sessions we were able to see how some commanders who were checking on subunits tried everything possible to find out more quickly what marks subordinates received. Those who succeeded immediately became unnerved. But if there is a higher score, is the question really one of marks? Training, even if it is given a high mark, requires further improvement. Even the highest mark should not lessen the responsibility of an officer for combat readiness.

In this connection, I will give this example. There was a time when Captain V. Sinelnikov was talked about as a future competent commander. But, I would say, he was let down by his chase after marks. He tried to get outstanding and good marks in any way possible. It is well known what the method is in such situations—cramming. But it has never led to stable success. In the final analysis, the senseless pursuit of marks leads to the fact that even a good subunit dissipates its combat potential.

Or take this aspect of the problem under discussion. Lieutenant Colonel R. Zimaliyev in a rather unusual way once showed his concern about the combat readiness of subordinates. The day before a performance evaluation the least prepared officers went on leave or on temporary duty assignment. Imaginary invalids appeared among those soldiers who were poorly prepared. . . This is what the pursuit of a high mark can turn into. As if the level of combat readiness can be regulated by skillful trickery. The matter is now corrected here.

Of course, shortcomings in the style of work of officers in units in many ways is conditioned by the style of work of officers at higher headquarters. If we even look at the recent past, we can cite many facts when different representatives of the district staff came to the unit as inspectors. The response of subordinates to this kind of style, of course, could only be window-dressing. For example, we made Major Generals G. Kravchenko and A. Lomotov and Colonel G. Gorodnichenko strictly responsible for this style of work. The party organizations of command echelons, departments and services also had their say. Regular reports of communists at assemblies and meetings of bureau on the findings of temporary duty assignments in line units became the rule in a majority of them.

[Question] I was told about two company commanders in one of the units. They are alike in many ways. But service is going well for one of them and not for the other. And colleagues only raise their hands in dismay.

[Answer] Very much depends on the attitude toward an assigned task. Captains R. Khizbulin and V. Ryabushkin, for example, also command companies. But while Khizbulin serves, I would say, with ease and well, Ryabushkin literally is serving time.

This is a very serious task for us today—to help each officer, warrant officer, sergeant and soldier to see the beauty of service. For there is so much that is bright and heroic in military work which ennoble a person. Conducting "round tables" has become one of the forms of this kind of work with us. The sorest points are raised at them. And I should note in general that examples of democratization in the vital activity of collectives are more clearly apparent. People are becoming convinced in practice that the process of democratization is inseparably tied with the strengthening of one-man command, increasing the role and influence of party and Komsomol organizations, and the activation of the participation of all personnel in the affairs of military collectives. The democratization of army life helps to affirm social justice in the resolution of problems that impact on the interests of people, and it becomes a very important condition for improving military skills on the basis of the broad development of creativity, initiative and self-dependence.

[Question] Comrade Colonel General, you were elected a delegate to the 19th All-Union Party Conference. Naturally, there will be an increase in tasks. . .

[Answer] Work will be increased for everyone. In fact, the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee aim us

toward this. And, I believe, that responsibility should also be added. Without this, we will not be able to resolve questions of restructuring, including the question of increasing combat readiness.

13052

**Georgian Chief of Staff on Interoperation With
Military Units, State of Republic's CD**
*18010370 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Apr 88 Second Edition p 4*

[Interview with Lt Gen M. Elbakidze, Georgian chief of staff for civil defense, by Lt Col N. Mulyar; date and place not specified; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction: "Threatened by the Elements"]

[Text] First snow drifts and then landslides and floods destroyed hundreds of houses in Georgia last year and ruined thousands of hectares of arable land. Lives were lost. Now the elements are once again being felt. Recently in Borzhomskiy Rayon near the village of Daba, strong mud flows washed away the railroad bed. There is a danger of the onslaught of the elements in other places. At the request of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col N. Mulyar, Lt Gen M. Elbakidze, republic chief of staff for civil defense, tells how they are preparing to meet this threat.

[Question] Comrade lieutenant general, civil defense staffs and formations are participating in subduing the elements and in eliminating their consequences. What lessons did they draw from the past and how prepared are they for possible new tests?

[Answer] I will begin with the private factor. When the raging Rioni broke through to the territory of the Ferroalloys Plant imeni G. Nikoladze, nonmilitarized civil defense formations led by reserve lieutenants G. Gole-diani and N. Nebiridze stopped the rupture in just a few hours and the plant continued to work and to produce output.

The commanders of many other nonmilitarized civil defense formations demonstrated the ability to assess the situation quickly and to make the proper decision. Unfortunately, however, not all worked this way. Some civil defense staffs established on the spot, finding themselves in extreme conditions, were not able to make the necessary decisions independently and to take responsibility. And this, of course, as well as our omissions are the result of inadequate instruction and the poor training of works commanders and other specialists for defense against the elements and production accidents.

The republic civil defense staff analyzed all of these cases. We came to the conclusion that serenity and complacency took root for some time in the very civil defense system of the republic. Some civil defense directors and key specialists did not carry out any exercises with subordinates. And, let us be frank, they themselves did not study. The local party committees and soviet authorities were confronted with the question of the necessity of putting greater demands on those responsible for the training of workers, employees and kolkhoz members to carry out their functional civil defense obligations. The republic civil defense staff specified the plans for the evacuation of the population and showed

concern that the rayons properly prepare the roads department and municipal services in case the elements strike so that they have the necessary equipment, fuel, and additional fuel sources.

The winter this year was no less severe than last year. A great deal of snow fell in the mountains. Our estimates show that the water level will rise in the rivers Adzhariya and Kura as well as in the basins of the river Khramya. In the case of the flood threat, the population will be evacuated from the threatened zones. Civil defense activists of the rayons are now holding classes with the population. In many enterprises, in particular those where reserve captains T. Nizharadze and V. Mamuladze and Sr Lt of the Reserve T. Gogiasvili head civil defense formations, they have set up observation posts and are carrying out reinforcement work.

Nonmilitarized formations have been made completely ready. They are undergoing training. At the same time, one must not fail to note that not everywhere are they being trained responsibly to combat the elements. The construction of shore reinforcement lines is proceeding slowly in Ochamchirskiy, Dzhevskiy and several other rayons. Nor have they fully thought out questions in the enlightening of the population here. In general, there are many problems. And we are now taking extra measures to resolve them.

[Question] Continuing the conversation about the preparation of civil defense forces and resources for action under complex conditions, I would like to know how the interaction of nonmilitarized formations with the subunits of Transcaucasus Military District has been organized.

[Answer] There is a constant exchange of information about the situation in the zones of probable landslides and floods between the republic civil defense staffs and the district staff. They have developed a plan for joint action in the event of natural disasters. Together with soldiers, we recently artificially set off avalanches in the region of Krestovyy Pass. More than 50 avalanches were artificially released 2 days ago.

There are also examples of interaction of soldiers and nonmilitarized formations in carrying out real tasks. In particular, nonmilitarized formations of Dzhevskiy Rayon and the soldiers of the unit in which Lt Col A. Trofimov serves who came to their aid worked in an efficient and orderly manner in freeing the inhabitants of the mining settlement of Kvaisi from its snowy imprisonment. And let us remember the action of Pvt R. Mamedov, an Azerbaijani, who gave his life last year in saving 28 inhabitants of the village of Chaladidi. This feat will go down in the history of the friendship of the peoples of the Transcaucasus.

[Question] In looking back, one can see that many people simply lacked elementary knowledge and skills in questions involving defense against natural disasters. How is the propagandizing of civil defense knowledge among the population now organized?

[Answer] You are right. In Khobskiy, Dushetskiy and Ambrolaurskiy rayons, for example, the consequences of natural disasters were significantly lessened through the fact that the civil defense staffs carried out timely training and practical classes with the population.

We took this lesson into account and opportunely recalculated the forces and resources of our formations and defined more accurately their provision with equipment. Locally we carried out instructive and practical lessons and staff training with leading personnel. We are having

specialists appear on radio and television more frequently. Such a form of work as the showing of educational films on the subject of civil defense in the republic's movie theaters has also justified itself. We organize excursions of teams of civil defense specialists and leading workers to remote settlements, kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

But there are many problems. We are not always successful, for example, in getting some directors out of their chairs so that they might receive instruction in civil defense. Another concern is the educational-material base of civil defense in the VUZes, general-education schools, and vocational and technical schools. There are difficulties with the technical equipment of nonmilitarized formations and the organization of communications with remote regions. All of these problems, of course, are the subject of the constant attention of the republic civil defense staff. We are proceeding from the fact that everything must be ready to resolve the tasks with which we have been entrusted.

9746

USSR People's Control Looks Into Military Housing Shortage

18010424a Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jun 88 p 3

[Article from the military department of PRAVDA under "We Serve the Soviet Union" rubric: "In the Same Position"]

[Text] The editor's mail shows that the housing problem of the armed forces is more acute than it seemed when the report "In Search of Their Own Home" (PRAVDA, 20 April 1988) was published.

We remind you briefly what it dealt with. In many cities, officers released to the reserve have been waiting several years for apartments, even though a decree of the CPSU Central Committee and Council of Ministers states that they must be provided with them within 3 months. For this reason, many of them, having left the army, continue to live at the garrisons. Doubtless this does even more to complicate the housing problem in the armed forces.

Our readers expressed the desire to change the existing system of assigning housing to officers. In particular, they proposed putting them in line for an apartment in the city chosen for residence several years before they are released to the reserve. This, by the way, would give them the possibility of calmly finishing their service in even the most remote garrisons without having to resort to any means in striving to be transferred to the necessary city.

The newspaper received many, very many responses to this statement and the letters continue to come in. They show pain, anger and bewilderment and more and more often the question is raised: "The newspaper came out strongly and correctly but what comes next? Are any measures being taken?"

"I am not going to talk about myself," writes V. Gornovoy from Leningrad Oblast, "I have a typical officer's fate. But here is what I want to draw attention to. Yes, glasnost is yielding its fruit; the newspapers are publishing materials that are simply astonishing and revealing negative facts that we did not even suspect. This, of course, is good. But, as they say, it is not good if nothing comes out of it. Because frequently no measures are taken on the most pressing statements. It all disappears in the sand. The impression is created that our all-powerful bureaucracy adapted very quickly to glasnost and 'reacts' to everything as in the Eastern saying: 'The dog barks but the caravan is moving....' And, it seems to me, all of this is done quite consciously: inaction in the revelry of glasnost gives rise to unbelief among honest people but bureaucrats probably become more certain of their invincibility...."

"Still, I would very much like to know what measures the Ministry of Defense is taking on the statement of PRAVDA on the housing question."

We must disappoint you, Vasilii Georgiyevich. We have not yet received an answer from the Ministry of Defense. A few days ago, a response arrived from the political directorate of the Ural Military District that said: "Acknowledging the newspaper's statement to be current and topical, the command and political directorate of the district took prompt measures to eliminate the shortcomings in the provision of military personnel and their family members with housing and to establish the strictest legality in its distribution and use...." The response goes on to describe in detail the specific measures being taken in the district to resolve the housing problem.

But we have already written that the housing situation in Ural Military District is not the most difficult. The USSR Committee of People's Control checked several fleets and districts and the picture that was revealed is, let us be frank, a sad one. Nevertheless, the most unenviable position is often that of officers who served in the army for 25 or 30 years and suddenly found themselves, as we say, with neither house nor home.

"...I ask you to consider this letter as being addressed to the 19th All-Union Party Conference," writes the wife of the serviceman Comrad Glukhov from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. "My husband and I served 26 years and during the entire time we had no apartment. We were in Transbaykal for 10 years and now the circumstances are such that my husband is being pensioned from the Group of Forces in Germany and we have no apartment in the Soviet Union. Where shall we go? My father served in the army 30 years but did not receive an apartment. Our son serves in the military orchestra but has no apartment. But after having served 26 years, have we really not earned an apartment...?"

"It is no secret that the effectiveness of the newspaper's statements still basically depends entirely upon the position of the heads of organizations and departments," writes V. Golubev from Leningrad. "Considerable time has already passed since the publication of the article 'In Search of Their Own Home' but the position of the leaders upon whom the resolution of the housing problem depends is unknown."

We are readdressing our readers' questions to the Ministry of Defense and hope to receive an answer to them.

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Ministry of Defense Said To Lag in Preparing for Jan 89 Introduction of Economic Reform

18010424b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian Second Edition 5 Jun 88 p 2

[Article by Col N. Karasev, doctor of economic sciences, under "How Do We Approach the Reform?" rubric: "Following the Logic of Changes"]

[Text] As is noted in the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee on the 19th All-Union Party Conference, substantial work is under way in the country to transfer

enterprises to cost accounting, progressive forms of organizing and stimulating labor, and self-administration. Enterprises, military construction organizations and scientific research institutions of the USSR Ministry of Defense are moving to new conditions of management only after 1 January 1989. They were given the possibility of relying on the experience of civilian enterprises that have already gone over to full cost accounting.

Unfortunately, the preparatory work is, in my opinion, unsatisfactory. In this matter, we are proving once again that we are good at administration but hardly know how to manage. By the way, on paper everything is going according to plan. Special commissions of central institutions and enterprises have been established that generalize the suggestions of labor collectives and universal economic education has been developed.

Initially this appeared solid but now we are more and more often hearing the disturbing question: "Will we be able to restructure ourselves in time?" It is being raised by workers and engineers and managers of enterprises, where I regularly work in a commission to assist in economic reforms.

What are the reasons for doubts of this kind? We will name only the main ones. The experience of the enterprises of the national economy that are adopting full cost accounting has shown convincingly that reform has its own strict logic, the violation of which is fraught with such negative processes as the disruption of production plans, falling wages, and labor conflicts. This is why at the beginning of the year the government worked out a clear program of action for the central economic authorities as well as ministries, departments and enterprises that are going over to full cost accounting and self-financing beginning in January 1989. The facts show that this program is not being fully observed in the Ministry of Defense.

Judge for yourselves. In February-April at the enterprise level, it was necessary to carry out work to determine specific customers and suppliers and to establish direct economic ties between them. This work is not yet finished. Many military enterprises, especially scientific research institutions, still do not know all of their economic partners for next year.

It was decided in April to give the enterprises and institutions stable economic standards for the last 2 years of the five-year plan, proceeding from the new funding structure. This has not been done either. In the same period, it was ordered that the system be determined for transferring subsidized and unprofitable enterprises to self-financing beginning the following year on the basis of the progressive reduction of the state subsidies set for them. Nor has this been done. At the enterprise where Col V. Maksimov serves, for example, they tentatively calculated that they need about 500,000 rubles. Where can they get this sum?

As a result, many military enterprises and research institutions were not able to present their proposals for the 1989 plan on time. In turn, the Ministry of Defense was also supposed to present to USSR Gosplan a draft plan for the economic and social development of the ministry in the following year. If someone asserts that there is such a plan, then it is not even the logic but the essence of the radical economic reform that has been violated. For it presupposes that the plans are drawn up from below and not from above.

The question arises: Who is at fault here? Most often they name the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. The fact is that it has been entrusted with the scientific-methodological management of economic work in the army and navy. It bears responsibility. I am convinced, however, that the Central Finance Directorate will not be able to handle this work. It, after all, is an agency of state budget financing, that is, the redistribution of centralized monetary resources. Meanwhile, the essence of the current economic reform is fundamentally different.

In the first place, it consists in the transition from primarily state budgetary financing to the self-financing of enterprises. In the second place, there is a sharp increase in the sphere of economic relations within the ministry. These relations include production, distribution and redistribution, exchange and consumption. In its current form, the Central Finance Directorate does not cover and cannot cover all the problems having to do with the economic reform. This is equal, let us say, to transferring the functions of the country's central scientific-economic staff from USSR Gosplan to the Ministry of Finance.

I believe that an urgent question is now that of the necessity of the establishment in the Ministry of Defense of an authoritative scientific-economic committee capable of really being in charge of the restructuring of the economic mechanism. This can be done through the elimination of some economic services that are becoming unnecessary under the conditions of the reform. Such proposals, in particular, were also stated in the research institution where Maj A. Zhizhin serves and at a number of enterprises.

Frequently officials refer to the specific nature of military enterprises compared with civilian enterprises. There are indeed specific characteristics. From the point of view of economic relations, however, they involve the fact that military enterprises frequently have more favorable conditions for the transition to full cost accounting than do civilian enterprises.

This assertion may be surprising for some. But this is so: the basic principles of the economic work of military and civilian enterprises coincide under the old conditions: both are primarily state budgetary institutions. But the economic ties of civilian enterprises are considerably broader than those of military enterprises. The national

economic plants and associations often have thousands of consumers of their output and suppliers of the means of production belonging to dozens of other ministries and agencies of the country. It is considerably more difficult to introduce full cost accounting under such conditions.

I think that it is now necessary to carry out a number of important measures in a very short time.

In the first place, change the economic ties within the Ministry of Defense so as to put the producers in direct relations with customers. I think that there is no need to demonstrate that their close interaction will lead to mutual interest and responsibility. In this way, realistic preconditions will be established for the decisive eradication of the practice of bureaucratic administration and petty interference on the part of central authorities, a reduction of the amount of reporting, and a curtailment of the size of administrative staff and expenditures in support of it.

Secondly, it is necessary as soon as possible to get to the enterprises all the planning documents foreseen by the USSR Law on the State Enterprise on control figures, standards, limits and state orders.

Thirdly, it is important to determine in time to which of the two models of full cost accounting established in the country a particular enterprise will go. For this determines to which economic standards they need to be oriented.

There are many other specific and urgent matters with which no one is yet dealing seriously. And some people are expressing direct doubts about the necessity of transferring military enterprises to full cost accounting on the basis of self-financing. That is, they say, we are handling matters under the existing system.

I think that this is a short-sighted position. Above all one must honestly acknowledge that the administrative system in our agency is extremely inefficient.

It is also necessary to keep something else in mind. The acuteness of the social problems in the units and formations and at military enterprises is well known: there is a shortage of well-ordered housing and facilities in the social area. At the same time, many military enterprises have incomes in the millions but have no right to dispose of the existing resources independently. I am convinced that the only possible way out here is the decisive transition to the new management conditions. Otherwise there is the direct danger of lagging behind perestroika. And this is inadmissible.

Role of Non-Russians in Histories of World War II Criticized

18000566a Moscow *SOVETSKAYA KULTURA* in Russian 28 Jul 88 p 6

[Article by Guards Col (Ret) V. Muradyan, doctor of historical sciences, from Yerevan: "The Complete Truth About the History of the War"]

[Text] [Editorial Introduction] I read with extreme interest in *Sovetskaya Kultura* (2 February 1988) a talk by your correspondent with the prominent military historians M.M. Kiryan and Ya.Yu. Kirshin. As a direct participant in the war (I left for the front from the third year on the university history faculty as a company political instructor, I was a regimental commissar, the deputy head of the political section of a division and ended the war in Prague as the chief of the political section of a rifle division), and as a historian who has studied the activities of the CPSU during the war years, I would like to continue the discussion commenced in *Sovetskaya Kultura*. [End of Editorial Introduction]

In our days, when Soviet historical science is analyzing the events of the past from the positions of restructuring and glasnost and when under the conditions of the cult of personality and the stagnation phenomena, the examination of these was of a speculative nature, each new appearance in the press on these questions evokes lively interest not only for historians but also readers. I must agree with the opinion of Mikhail Mitrofanovich Kiryan and Yuri Yakovlevich Kirshin that there still are many "blank spots" in our military history, there are unexplored pages, figures who are unnecessarily extolled as well as forgotten heroes. But since in the conversation of the correspondent with the military historians they did not touch upon the "blank spots" in the area of nationality relations in our country during the years of the Great Patriotic War, I would like to take up precisely these questions.

The Leninist nationality policy of our party not only brilliantly withstood the harsh testing of the war years, but was also enriched with new content and new forms of its manifestation in all spheres of the life of the multinational Soviet people and their militant vanguard, the Communist Party. But can it be said that the nationality policy of the CPSU and the nationality relations in the USSR under the conditions of the war have been analyzed with sufficient profundity and justness in the fundamental works relating to the Great Patriotic War? It would be difficult to give a single affirmative answer.

It is interesting to note that in the abundant literature published in our nation over the last 15-20 years, there has not been a single special work on the question of nationality relations or one devoted to the nationality policy of the CPSU during the years of the Great Patriotic War. At the same time, in the examination of this problem there are both overlooked pages, obvious underestimations and even errors.

For example, let us look at the third volume of the six-volume "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945" [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945]. On page 227, where they discuss the efforts of party-political work in the troops in 1943, we read: "Political work was developed widely among the soldiers of non-Russian nationality who in certain armies comprised one-fifth of the personnel." This is a flagrant mistake which belittles the role of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR in the fight against Nazi Germany. In essence this plays into the hands of the ideological sword-bearers of imperialism who have spread the notion that the non-Russian peoples of the USSR did not wish to fight for "mother Russia."

I feel that the ten-volume work which is being prepared should give a prominent place to the unmasking of the bourgeois falsifiers of CPSU nationality policy. The history of the struggle of the multinational Soviet people against the Nazi invaders provides very rich material for this. For example, authentic documents taken from the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense [TsAMO SSSR] clearly indicate that all the Soviet peoples took an active part in the defense of the socialist fatherland. The Russian people, having assumed the main burden of the war on their shoulders, fielded many more soldiers than all the other Soviet peoples taken together. For example, in the divisions organized on the territory of the RSFSR, soldiers of Russian nationality comprised from 60 to 80 percent. In the national autonomous republics of the RSFSR, in the combined-arms divisions, the number of men of non-Russian nationality approached 40 percent. This must be mentioned as it was the actual truth.

The involvement of the other fraternal peoples in the war must also be properly described. Contrary to the assertion of Volume 3 of the six-volume edition, this involvement was expressed in much more impressive figures.

Now a word about the percentage of men of non-Russian nationality on the fronts. In the legendary 62d Army which directly defended Stalingrad, 51.6 percent of the personnel was made up of Russians while the remainder belonged to men of non-Russian nationality. In the summer of 1942, over 42 percent of the personnel in the Northern Troop Group of the Transcaucasian Front were men of non-Russian nationality and on the Kalinin Front, the number of soldiers and junior commanders of non-Russian nationality in individual formations approached 46 and more percent. All these data which were taken by us from the TsAMO SSSR, and they could be continued, persuasively repudiate the assertions of the six-volume edition.

We must also discuss one other collective work. This is the question of the publication "Partiyno-politicheskaya rabota v Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Silakh v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg." [Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces During the Years

of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945] (Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1963). On the level of the problem raised by us, I would like to point to a series of lamentable oversights by the authors.

Two chapters of this work are devoted to the defensive engagements between the Don and the counteroffensive by our troops at Stalingrad. You read and marvel. How could the authors of these chapters overlook a series of important events in the life of the nation and army related to the party's measures to further strengthen the friendship of the Soviet peoples and the combat fraternity of their soldiers? As is known, due to the fact that in the spring of 1942 the operational army began receiving large reinforcements from the national republics and many of the new recruits had not undergone military service, their knowledge of Russian was poor or completely lacking, the GlavPU RKKA [Main Political Directorate of the Worker-Peasant Red Army], upon instructions of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee worked out an entire range of measures to further strengthen the international solidarity of the personnel. These measures were set out in the directive of the GlavPU RKKA, No 012 of 17 September 1942 "On Indoctrinational Work With Red Armymen and Junior Commanders of Non-Russian Nationality." Party and Komsomol meetings were held everywhere in the units and these were devoted to the practical implementation of the tasks set out in the directive.

Cannot one be amazed that in such an extensive work devoted to party political work in the Soviet Armed Forces during the war years, this directive is not even mentioned? Or let us take the following example. At the very peak of the battle on the Volga, on 31 October 1942 *Pravda* published a letter from the Uzbek people to the Uzbek soldiers. Over the first half of 1943, the Kazakh, Armenian, Kirghiz, Turkmen, Azerbaijani, Tajik, Tatar, Chuvash and other peoples sent letters to their fellow compatriot soldiers. Millions of people put their signature to these letters. The letters were printed in *Pravda* as well as in the central and republic newspapers and were discussed on the fronts. The soldiers of non-Russian nationality of the various fronts reported to their peoples on the carrying out of their commands. The response report letters were also published widely. There is no need to show what an enormous role this played in increasing the patriotic and international solidarity of the troops and their battleworthiness. But, unfortunately, the compilers and authors of the work on party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces during the war years did not point this out.

Nor did they point out one other very major event in the life of our Armed Forces and the party organizations of the Union and autonomous republics. At the very peak of the Battle of Kursk, at the end of July and the beginning of August 1943, a 20-day Army-Wide Conference of Front and District Agitators Working Among the

Soldiers of Non-Russian Nationality was held in Moscow. The work of this seminar conference was directed by the Candidate Member of the Politburo, the Secretary of the VKP(b) Central Committee and Chief of the GlavPU RKKA, A.S. Cherbakov. Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin made a major speech to the agitators. Also giving lectures were D.Z. Manuil'skiy, Ye.M. Yaroslavskiy and A.M. Pankratov and responsible workers from the Union and autonomous republics. Some 25 front agitators of different nationalities shared their experience. The conference participants determined the methods of party-political work in further strengthening the international solidarity of the troops in the course of the new offensive operations by the Red Army. However, in the special chapter of the above-indicated work and entitled "Party-Political Work in the Battle of Kursk and in the Crossing of the Dnieper" (pp 263-290) there is not even mention of such a major event.

The above-indicated shortcomings and the underestimating of important events in the life of the party, the people and the army relate not only to the work devoted to an historical review of party-political work in the troops during the war years. Certain other publications also suffer from these.

In the conversation of the *Sovetskaya Kultura* correspondent with the military historians, mention was made of the preparing of a new edition of the Military Encyclopedia. I would agree that in the Encyclopedia the style is almost telegraphic. But when it is a question not of one or another individual, but rather such sagas as the Battle of Moscow, the Battle of Stalingrad, the Battle of the Caucasus and so forth, such terseness is not justified. We have in front of us the bulky "Entsiklopediya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Encyclopedia of the Great Patriotic War] published by Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya. It, naturally, mentions the Battle of Stalingrad. But there is not a single word about the combat fraternity of the defenders of Stalingrad. Was there really nothing to say?

The same criticism could be leveled against the material devoted to the Battle of the Caucasus where an enormous role was played by the strong rear of its defenders, the multinational Transcaucasus. The Battle of the Caucasus involved 19 minority divisions of the Azerbaijani, Armenian and Georgian peoples. It would be possible to give many examples showing that one of the chief factors ensuring the strong defense of the Caucasus was the fraternal friendship of the peoples. The enemy planned to put the peoples of this multinational region against the Russian people, but was worthily rebuffed. The representatives of the peoples of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia meeting in Tbilisi on 23 August 1942 at an anti-Nazi meeting adopted an Appeal to Their Peoples which proclaimed: "There is no force in the world which could split the Transcaucasian peoples or separate them from the great Russian people, our elder brother...."

I assume that the new editions of the Encyclopedia as well as the ten-volume edition will eliminate such "blank

spots." I feel that it is completely valid to mention the arbitrariness of Stalin who was responsible for sending entire peoples of the Northern Caucasus from their homeland.

As is known, in the course of the war there was a territorial shift of millions of Soviet people related to the evacuation of persons and valuable equipment from the western regions of the nation to the East. The measures related to the organizing of the relocating of industrial enterprises and their insulation in the eastern regions of the nation have been widely taken up in the war's historiography. But, in our view, there has not been a sufficiently profound elucidation of the role of national relationships in the process of settling enormous masses of people in the eastern national republics where these people did not know the languages, customs and mores of the local population. Certainly they had to live and work together for the front under the difficult wartime conditions. But here also there is something to be said about the nature of the Soviet system and about the principles of socialist internationalism.

Being concerned for these problems for many years I have become convinced that one of the reasons that the nationality relations in our country during the war years have not been properly taken up in the general works is that virtually no scholars from the Union republics have been involved in preparing them. It is not difficult to be persuaded of this, in looking at the membership of the author collectives.

To substantiate such a criticism, let me give one other example. I happened to speak at the All-Union Scientific Conference in Moscow devoted to the 40th anniversary of the victory. I sent one major contribution to the conference Organizing Committee. The program compiled by it did not reflect neither the multinationality of our nation or the international nature of the victory itself. Of the 52 speakers and reporters, 48 came from Moscow, there was 1 each from the Ukraine, Belorussia, Transcaucasia and Central Asia. The conference presidium recognized this criticism, but neither historical science nor the friendship of peoples was the richer for it.

Presently, under the conditions of glasnost, I can write openly about these negative phenomena. Their roots go not only into the period of stagnation, but much deeper. Thus, during the war years more than 200 soldiers and partisans blocked the firing slit of enemy pillboxes with their bodies and, having taken the fire on themselves and at the price of their lives, ensured the success of the advancing extended chains of their subunits.

It has been established that the first in the war to carry out such a great feat of self-sacrifice was the former Vologda worker and young political leader, Aleksandr Pankratov. In the fighting at Novgorod, at a crucial moment of combat, he, in leading the men of his company forward, threw himself on an enemy machine gun and blocked its fire with his body. Later, in 1941, he

was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. During the counteroffensive of our troops at Moscow, the same feat was carried out by Sgt V.V. Vasilkovskiy, on the Kalinin Front by the soldier Ya.N. Paderin, on the Voronezh Front by the Kirghiz youth Cholponbay Tuleberdiyev and many others.

At the same time, the only extensive treatment has been given to the feat of Aleksandr Matrosov who carried this out in February 1943. From Pankratov to Matrosov there were 53 soldiers of different nationalities who carried out analogous feats. Stalin drew attention to the newspaper information about Matrosov's feat. And hence the erroneous phrase that all the heroes who sacrificed themselves for the sake of the socialist fatherland supposedly "repeated" the feat of Matrosov. We feel that no one repeated someone else's feat. Each of these 200 patriots carried out his own feat.

Finally, one other question. In the literature on the Great Patriotic War, it is pattered that prior to the revolution many peoples of the nation were not involved in military service and the Tsarist government did not trust them with weapons. But Soviet power involved all the peoples of the USSR in the armed defense of the motherland. This is a very great and interesting problem which cannot be exhausted by several brief phrases. I feel that in the ten-volume edition, one must show in detail why, in World War I, when the Tsarist government wanted to mobilize several age groups of the male population of Central Asia for digging, that is, excavating work, the entire region put up strong resistance. But during the years of the Great Patriotic War hundreds of thousands of the sons of the Uzbek, Turkmen, Tajik, Kirghiz and other peoples of the nation arm in arm with Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians and the representatives of the other Soviet peoples rose to the defense of Soviet Russia. In military history science this is yet another "blank spot."

The history of the Soviet multinational state and all its peoples, the history of their great accomplishments against German Nazism is rich in vivid events and stirring documents which convincingly show the role of the combat cooperation of the Soviet peoples headed by the great Russian people in achieving our victory.

The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev, in his report "October and Restructuring: The Revolution Continues," in speaking about the viability of the socialist system and about the strength of the multinational Soviet state, in particular, commented that we withstood the merciless testing of the war because the war became a question of all the people and because "everyone rose to defend the fatherland: the old and the young, the men and the women, all the nations and nationalities of the great nation."

The truth of history requires that in the subsequent editions of works on the history of the war, all the sources of victory be described thoroughly. Certainly

there should be proper treatment of the party's activities to turn the friendship of the Soviet peoples into one of the main factors determining the outcome of the war in favor of the multinational Soviet people.

10272

Archives Document Torture of Marshal Meretskov
18010254a Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in
Russian 20 Apr 88 p 13

[Text] Memory is entering ever more decisively into our lives, not only eliminating the blank spots of history, but also powerfully influencing today's research and solutions and everyone's profound awareness of the purest goal, whose achievement is incompatible with foul means. Nobody has been forgotten and nothing has been forgotten—this sacred slogan pertains to everyone—to the victims of fascism, to the victims of that merciless machine of destruction which did not even give them the opportunity to die while fighting against fascism. But there is still a drop of their blood in the victory over these things.

Memory requires a monument—an embodied symbol of anti-forgetfulness. A worthy memorial to those who died in the war will finally be raised. Even if it is a half century late. Inevitably approaching, but with even greater tardiness, is a memorial in no way less important—to those who perished from lawlessness. While waiting for a decision which, we hope, is not far away, what is keeping us from honoring them in metal and stone, not all at once, but for the time being just "a few" of the "individuals"? These are people whose names need not be looked up by researchers—they are known even today and they appear to us just as they were. But without the insulting lies.

During the past months I have discovered much that has been hidden away in the judicial archives. I wish to discuss just one page of recent history.

But first a quotation from a book that is well known to everyone. "In the Service of the People"—this is what it is called. It has gone through three editions. The author is Marshal of the Soviet Union Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov.

"Morning came on the second day of the war. I received an urgent summons to Moscow. (At that time the army general and USSR deputy people's commissar of defense Meretskov was in the Baltic area leading our troops' resistance against the fascist invaders.—A. V.)... On that same day, i.e., 23 June, I was appointed permanent adviser under the general command staff.

"In September 1941 I received a new appointment. I recall that in this connection I was summoned to the office of the supreme commander. I. V. Stalin...took a couple of steps toward me and said:

"Hello, Comrade Meretskov! How do you feel?"

The supreme commander had every reason to ask the general this question. For he was well aware of where and how the commander had spent the months that separated the first and second paragraphs I have quoted. And the author himself, of course, remembered them just as well as he did the first phrase he ever encountered at the headquarters.

On 24 June 1941 (according to other documents it was the 26th) the deputy people's commissar was arrested. What happened to him after that we shall learn from a different quotation. You will not find it in the books; it is in a criminal case. Its "author" is one of the most bloodthirsty of Beria's henchmen, Lev Shvartsman.

"Physical methods of influence," declared Shvartsman after he had already been convicted (1955), "were applied to Meretskov first by high officials (he has in mind Beria's closest henchmen, Merkulov and Vlodzimirskiy.—A. V.) and then by me and my followers Zimenkov and Sorokin. He was beaten with rubber sticks. Before his arrest there was evidence from more than 40 witnesses that Meretskov was a participant in the military conspiracy. In particular there was evidence that he had made arrangements with Kork and Uborevich (eminent military figures executed along with Tukhachevskiy in 1937.—A. V.) to assassinate Stalin."

A member of the court, Col of Justice Likhachev asked Shvartsman: "Are you aware that you are beating an outstanding military leader and a worthy person?" The answer: "My instructions came from so high up that they are not subject to discussion."

On instructions from high places, right before the war and during the first days after it began the ones to be arrested were those who had survived after the almost universal destruction of high Red Army command personnel at the beginning of the thirties. Another immense "trial of the military" was underway.

In addition to Meretskov, the "conspirators" included: People's Commissar of Arms B. L. Vannikov; Assistant Chief of the General Staff, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Lt Gen of Aviation Y. V. Smushkevich; Chief of the PVO Directorate, Hero of the Soviet Union, Col Gen G. M. Shtern; Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Hero of the Soviet Union, Lt Gen of Aviation P. V. Rychagov; Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Troop Commander of the Baltic Special Military District, Col Gen A. D. Loktionov; Deputy Chief of the Main Artillery Directorate of the USSR NKO G. K. Savchenko; Department Chief of this directorate S. O. Sklizkov; Chief of the Military Air Academy, Lt. Gen F. K. Arzhenukhin; Deputy Chief of the Arms Administration of the Air Force General Directorate, I. F. Sakriyer; Hero of the Soviet Union, Maj Gen of Aviation I. I. Proskurov; the eminent artillery designer Y. G. Taubin, and many, many others.

During those fateful days their place turned out to be not at the front but—in jail!

Practically every one of them deserves not a line in a newspaper but an entire book. Among the "conspirators" were heroes of the civil war, participants in battles in Spain, on Lake Khasan, and Khalkhin-Gole, and the most outstanding theoreticians and practitioners of military affairs. Three of them belonged to the Central Committee and five were deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet. And this was the "second echelon"—which came after the first had already been shot: Rychagov, for example, was barely 30 years old.

On 24 June 1941 right on the runway they arrested his wife, the well-known military pilot, Major Mariya Nesterenko—deputy commander of a special aviation regiment. The formula of the accusation: "...being the beloved wife of Rychagov, she could not but know (!) about her husband's traitorous activity."

I think it is a hopeless cause to try to find any one reason why they should undertake such a senseless action at this particular moment. Set loose at full steam, the machine of destruction whirled according to its own laws. It could no longer be halted. It needed conspiracies, sabotage, assassination attempts, and intrigues of enemies who were swarming everywhere. Otherwise the fear would begin to die out. Otherwise the apparatus set for suppression could get rusty and turn out to be unnecessary. Otherwise Stalin would turn his scorching gaze toward those who were "guarding poorly."

It is an idle question whether or not Stalin knew what kind of a court of law was developing. He might not have known if, as is written by Vannikov, whose memoirs were recently published by the magazine ZNAMYA, in his solitary cell (in July of 1941) he received an instruction from Stalin "to present in writing my considerations regarding measures concerning the development of arms production under the conditions of the military activities had been started." He might not have known if during the height of the investigation in the presence, as Shvartsman boasted 14 years later, of "plentiful evidence of their hostile activity" gleaned through the zeal of investigators like V. G. Ivanov, N. A. Kuleshov, A. A. Zozulov, Z. G. Genkin, A. N. Marusov, Ya. M. Raytses, I. I. Rodovanskiy, and others, by his imperial order, Meretskov, Vannikov and some 15 other eminent activists of the defense industry were released. These fortunes were returned right from their cells to their offices, and some were taken to Stalin in the Kremlin. But not all. Far from all of them...

You cannot remove the words from the song: the brutally beaten victims (except for Loktionov, who heroically withstood all the torture) finally "confessed" to what had been beaten out of them. It is terrible to read the latest testimonies of the torturers—about how Vannikov cried out, clutching his heart, how Meretskov was beaten until he was bloody, how Smushkevich rolled around on the

floor and groaned, how the tormented Shtern lost consciousness... "Kirill Afanasyevich, well that did not happen, it did not, it did not!"—Loktionov, in a confrontation, contorted with pain, imploringly extended his hands to Meretskov and then fell silent when he met his worn-out and lifeless gaze.

Let us bow our heads to those who could not hold up with the same compassion and understanding as we do to those who stood their ground. Let us believe the best expert on these affairs, Lavrentiy Beria, who gave testimony at the hearing: "I have no doubt that Meretskov, Vannikov, and others were mercilessly slaughtered, as at a butchery. That is how they got the slanderous testimony."

By naming those he needed and hence the ones to be released and saying nothing about the rest, Stalin had made a choice. Beria understood his Teacher well: after this he could act "according to his own discretion." Those in whose devotion the supreme commander believed were immediately transformed from spies and saboteurs into military commanders of the highest rank. Before he was released Merkulov called Meretskov Beria's right hand. The investigator Tikhonov, who was present during their conversation, recalled: "Meretskov said to him (to Merkulov—A. V.): 'Vsevelod Nikolayevich, previously we met without formality, but now I fear you.' But Merkulov just laughed at this."

He had reason to laugh: the power and the authority remained in the same hands. With Beria and company.

What happened is frightening even today—almost a half century later. Few people know about this murky mystery of October 1941. Let us reveal it.

The fascists were approaching Moscow. During the night between 15 and 16 October the NKVD central staff was evacuated to Kuybyshev. The most important of those under investigation—the main "objects" of this staff's work—were also moved there. A letter from Beria flew in pursuit of the courier for special instructions: the investigation was to be halted; they were not to be taken to court, but to be shot immediately. And on the list were 25 people.

It took another week to find them: even the "especially important" ones were lost in the crowd of arrested people who had been driven here. The rank-and-file investigators did not know about the order—they continued to "work". On 27 October Rodovanskiy questioned Arzhenukhin again, and on the morning of the 28th Raytses questioned Mariya Nesterenko. One of Beria's especially trusted men suddenly appeared—Rodose: "Let's go!"—without any explanation. Within a couple of minutes five covered vehicles were going out through the gates of the prison...

"Document. Kuybyshev, 28 October 1941. We the undersigned, in keeping with the order of the USSR people's commissar of internal affairs, commissar general of state security, Comrade L. P. Beria, of 18 October 1941 No 2756/B, executed a sentence of the VMS (highest measure of punishment.—ed.) of shooting of the following 20 convicts: Shtern, Grigoriy Mikhaylovich, Loktionov, Aleksandr Dmitriyevich, Smushkevich, Yakov Vladimirovich, Savchenko, Georgiy Kosmich, Rychagov, Pavel Vasilyevich, Sakriver, Ivan Filimonovich, Zasosov, Ivan Ivanovich, Volodin, Pavel Semenovich, Proskurov, Ivan Iosifovich, Sklizkov, Stepan Osipovich, Arahenukhin, Fedor Konstantinovich, Kavukov, Matvey Maksimovich, Sobornov, Mikhail Nikolayevich, Taubin, Yakov Grigoriyevich, Rozov, David Aronovich, Rozova-Yegorova, Zinaida Petrovna, Goloshchekin, Filipp Isayevich, Bulatov, Dmitriy Aleksandrovich, Nesterenko, Mariya Petrovna, Fibikh, Aleksandra Ivanovna. Signed: Sr Maj of State Security Bushiakov, Maj of State Security Rodos, Sr Lt of State Security Semenukhin."

Five others turned up in Saratov. They were shot at the same time—outside the city. Among these five was Mikhail Sergeyevich Kedrov, a party member since 1901, a senior chekist, and the closest follower of Dzerzhinskiy, who not long before that had been acquitted (!) by the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court. But in the archives next to the acquittal order lies a document drawn up after the fact concerning the execution of a nonexistent sentence of death by shooting.

Let us recall the date: 28 October 1941. The fascists were at the walls of Moscow, Leningrad had been blockaded, and the Ukraine, Moldavia, the Baltic states, and Belorussia had been occupied. It was on that day that the volleys thundered, drowned out by truck engines, at Kuybyshev and Saratov: innocent military leaders, commanders, and creators of arms were being destroyed. Three of them died along with their wives. At the hands of their own people. Their own?

How many of them were there—these victims of cruel punishment and lawlessness? Any figure given now, alas, cannot be precise. Historians deal in figures. But behind each "unit" that comprises it is a life that was cut off. And behind all of them taken together are millions of direct descendants: children, grandchildren, and even great grandchildren. Where can they mourn their dead? Nobody knows where their graves are or where the bullets ended their lives. Where should they bring flowers? Where should they come to spend a moment of silence? Where can they tell the young about the tragic stages of our great history?

But the place where on 28 October 1941 the military leaders and heroes were unlawfully exterminated—this place is known. It is the village of Barbysh—as is written in the file, that was the location so-called special section of the UNKVD for Kuybyshev Oblast. Who is keeping the local authorities from showing noble initiative and marking this place with some kind of monument? Do

those who perished really not deserve it? After all, the monument to the Unknown Soldier certainly does not keep anyone from raising a monument there to the one who is known, and it is a noble cause to begin one.

11772

Western Powers Said To Seek Stronger Influence in South Atlantic

18010397b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 May 88 Second Edition p 5

[Article by B. Eldarov]

[Text] The reports coming in recently from regions of the South Atlantic are alarming and frequently they are similar to war news releases. And all of them show one thing: a number of countries of the West, mainly the United States, are trying by any available means to strengthen their influence in this part of the world, to retain their military bases here, and put an end to the struggles of the peoples for freedom and national sovereignty.

The actions carried out by the imperialists under fabricated pretexts and with clearly provocative aims have repeatedly evoked sharp protests in countries of the South Atlantic region and serious concern throughout the world. No other reaction could have been expected under the conditions of the marked reduction of international tension, when the efforts of members of the world community must be directed toward renewal of the process of detente and easing of the problems and disputed situations and not toward aggravation of existing crises and the creation of new ones. An awareness of these realities lies at the basis of the South Atlantic variant of detente. It is embodied in the peace loving initiatives of the states of the region themselves, which are trying to protect themselves from threats from outside and to create favorable conditions for their political, economic, and social development. One of these initiatives is a proposal to create a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic.

The basic goals and provisions of this initiative of countries of the South Atlantic region were reflected in the resolution of the U.N. General Assembly No 41/11 of 27 October 1986, in which the region of the Atlantic Ocean between Africa and South America was declared a zone of peace and cooperation. It was recommended that all countries located there develop interaction for purposes of socioeconomic development, environmental protection, preservation of resources, and also the insurance of peace and security. An appeal was addressed to all other countries to "unwaveringly observe the status of the region of the South Atlantic as a zone of peace and cooperation, especially through reducing and ultimately eliminating their military presence there, not locating nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons for mass destruction there, and not importing to the region competition and conflicts that are foreign to it." All states

were called upon to cooperate in eliminating hotbeds of tension in the South Atlantic. In the resolution special attention was devoted to the need to eliminate the regime of apartheid in the UAR and to grant the people of Namibia the right to self-determination and independence.

In this respect, leaving to the side what is purely regional, the initiative of the countries of the South Atlantic region is obviously similar to the concept of an all-encompassing system of international peace and security that was advanced by the Soviet Union. As was noted by a member of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR minister of foreign affairs, E. A. Sheverdnadze during his visit to Argentina in October of last year, it has something directly in common "with our own political, moral, and ethical orientations, which prescribe arming ourselves with all the best that has been generated by the progressive political thought of various nations and various generations." This support was again confirmed during the course of the Soviet-Uruguayan high-level negotiations held recently in Moscow.

In light of today's complicated international situation and the situation in the South Atlantic itself, which has been deliberately complicated by certain circles, there is a predictable question: is all this not a utopia? A sober analysis shows that detente in this region is something quite feasible. And although the path to the goal may be anything but easy and will require a good deal of effort and energy, and although it will not always be straight, still a large step along this path has already been taken.

Antarctica, Latin America, and the southern part of the Pacific Ocean have already been declared peace zones or nonnuclear zones. Initiatives are being considered with respect to the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, the Korean peninsula, the entire Asian-Pacific Ocean region in general, the Mediterranean Sea and the Balkan peninsula, the Caribbean Sea, and northern and central Europe. More attention is being paid to the Soviet program for transforming the northern part of the planet, its polar and subpolar regions, into a zone of peace and fruitful interaction. These initiatives, which have been suggested by various states or groups of states and have been the fruit of collective foreign political efforts, convincingly show the desire of countries and peoples to create a safe world in spite of all obstacles. The geographical parameters of the proposed measures go beyond the framework of individual continents and regions; they strive to embrace the entire world. Are all these not real prototypes of a nonnuclear and nonviolent world, for which we can and must fight?

Potential Use of NATO Rapid Deployment Forces Against Warsaw Pact

18010397a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 May 88 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Col S. Leonidov]

[Text] Spain's decision to create her own rapid deployment forces, which was announced in the press, once again drew attention to operational formations of this kind which exist in a number of NATO countries. If one recalls history, the idea of highly mobile units originated about 30 years ago in the Pentagon. At the end of the seventies this idea assumed real features. In March of 1980 an already formed contingent of American troops was given the name rapid deployment forces. In 1983 the French government and in 1984 the British government gave their sanctions for the creation of their own highly mobile operative formations following the American model. After a brief hesitation, in 1985 a similar decision was made in Rome. And now it is Spain.

What is the reason for the lively interest in RDF's manifested by political and military leaders of NATO countries? People frequently speak about their ambitions which are expressed in the prestige of having contingents of this kind. This might be partially true. But it seems that this is not primarily a matter of vanity. There are more essential things. Behind this one can see more active armed intervention of the NATO countries in the affairs of the sovereign states in various regions of the planet. The invasion of Grenada by American forces, the colonial adventure of Great Britain in the South Atlantic, France's repeated intervention in the affairs of Chad, the actual participation of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy in military actions in Libya and the Persian Gulf region—such are the obvious examples of the neoglobal policies of the leading powers of the North Atlantic block. These are policies which require specific armed formations in a high degree of combat readiness for deployment and actions at any point of the world.

The basis of the rapid deployment forces in all of the aforementioned countries is comprised of the most combat-ready and mobile units: the 82d Airborne Division and the 101st Air Assault Division of the United States, the 11th Airborne Division and the 9th Infantry Division "marin" of France, the 5th separate airborne brigade and the 3d naval infantry brigade of Great Britain, the Folgore individual parachute brigade and the San Marko naval infantry division of Italy, and others. The Spanish command included in the RDF a parachute brigade, a squad of F-5 aircraft, and the foreign legion as well.

It is important to note this aspect also. As distinct from the RDF's of the United States, the rapid deployment forces of Western European NATO members are oriented not only toward the performance of tasks "in crisis situations outside the zones of NATO responsibility."

but also toward participation in combat actions against countries of the Warsaw Pact. Thus the French rapid deployment forces, according to the views of the national command, must be ready to be used in operations in the Central European theater both independently and as a part of the 1st French Army. One cannot rule out the possibility of the RDF's of the Italian and British military commands being used in Europe either. In NATO periodicals there have been announcements of existing plans to integrate the Spanish parachute brigade into the French-West German unit which will be formed this year or to include it in joint operations with the French RDF corps. Taking into account their supply of equipment, the high march capabilities, and the personnel training, the NATO command intends to utilize rapid deployment forces for raids into the deep rear of the enemy and also as a reserve of the main command for providing for the development of attacks in the most important strategic directions. People in the NATO staffs think that the RDF's are automated and powerful enough to do this.

It should be noted that the national command is taking steps to equip the larger and smaller RDF units with the most modern arms and military equipment. In France, for example, they plan to develop the latest helicopter with an increased cargo capacity and also, in conjunction with Italy, to acquire new ships with helicopter landing docks. In Spain pro-NATO circles have developed a propaganda campaign for increasing allocations for buying means of transportation for "transferring soldiers and officers to the places where they are needed."

The staffs and forces assigned to RDF are getting better operational and combat training. The British newspaper SUNDAY TELEGRAPH announced recently that Great Britain and France had agreed to conduct joint training of the RDF's on the island of Corsica. Special attention is attached to this kind of training from more than just the military standpoint. In NATO leading circles they see in this the possibility of demonstrating once again the "Atlantic solidarity" and binding France even more securely to the military structure of the block of which it is formally not a member.

11772

Markushin Commentary on NATO Nuclear Arms, Danish Policy

18010390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 May 88 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Lt Col V. Markushin under the rubric "Military and Political Commentary": "In the Grip of NATO"]

[Text] A climate of alarmed anticipation prevailed in the ruling circles of the North Atlantic alliance a little less than a month ago. Their attention was riveted to the progress of the fight developing in Denmark between the advocates and opponents of NATO nuclear policy. This struggle worsened sharply after a majority of the Danish

parliament approved a resolution introduced by the Social Democrats and which essentially demanded the refusal to permit military vessels with nuclear weapons on board to call in the country.

The resolution represented nothing revolutionary in essence. It just asserted that the presence of nuclear weapons on military vessels in peacetime was incompatible with the principles of the security policy of Denmark. That is, it simply prescribed the actual rather than purely formal observance of these principles. This turn was nonetheless openly perceived in the capitals of the leading countries of the North Atlantic bloc as an infringement on their security, as an attempt to undermine the foundations of the strategy of "nuclear deterrence," as something destroying "Atlantic unity." A whole stream of "cautionary" signals was organized in the direction of official Copenhagen in which it was asserted that the full membership of Denmark in NATO was threatened.

Strictly speaking, the chief bet was placed on this circumstance. Since it was accepted to feel that the majority of the Danes, despite their anti-nuclear views, were adherents of the participation of their country in NATO overall.

Orchestrating extremely coordinated pressure against Denmark, the "senior partners" of NATO were motivated first and foremost by the fear that the Danish precedent of "willful behavior" would be reflected in other countries in the bloc. Such prospects do not suit the American NATO leadership at all, aiming their current programs at a considerable increase in nuclear might rather than a reduction in it. This main direction of military policy was also approved at a session of the nuclear planning group that was held in Brussels at the end of April. The desire of the NATO upper leaders to pressure the European NATO countries, forcing them to follow unwaveringly the course of "modernization" of nuclear weapons, can be distinctly discerned behind the cautious phrases of the final communique.

The discussion, as is well known, concerns bringing an additional 2,300 modern nuclear munitions into Western Europe by the middle of the 1990's, improving nuclear artillery and the Lance missile and transferring aircraft able to carry nuclear weapons closer to the borders of the Soviet Union. Taking refuge in arguments that Soviet nuclear-missile might, they say, has threatened and will continue to threaten the West, the NATO leaders are insisting on preserving the strategy of nuclear deterrence and making the appropriate efforts to improve both conventional and nuclear systems.

And what of Denmark? Under the pressure from without, the government of P. Schluter resorted to the extraordinary step of early parliamentary elections. They were evidently counting on the fact that changes in the correlation of forces in a newly elected parliament would make it possible to revoke the anti-nuclear resolution.

The preliminary results of the election became known yesterday. The right-centrist coalition of four bourgeois parties preserved its position at the former level, receiving 70 of 179 seats. The largest opposition party, the Social Democrats, also remained in practically the same position as before, ensuring itself 55 seats in parliament. Marked changes in the disposition of the political forces thus did not occur overall.

The government of P. Schluter therefore did not achieve its aim. A considerable portion of the Danes

did not succumb to the NATO pressure. More than half of the voters had a positive attitude toward the resolution of the old-composition Folketing on not permitting vessels with nuclear weapons on board into the country. And this obviously cannot fail to have an effect on the positions of the new composition of the Folketing.

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